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Yearly Archives: 2014

FINRA Disciplinary Action Against Blackrock Capital LLC

In July 2014, Blackrock Capital LLC submitted a Letter of Acceptance, Waiver and Consent in which the firm was censured, fined $50,000 and required to comply with undertakings and revise the firm’s Written Supervisory Procedures. Without admitting or denying the findings, the firm consented to the sanctions and to the entry of findings that it charged its customers $60.50 on separate purchase or sale transactions in addition to or in place of a designated commission charge.

The findings stated that the firm characterized the charge on customer trade confirmations as “miscellaneous” and/or as an “additional fee.” A substantial portion of the $60.50 charge was not attributable to any specific cost or expense the firm incurred or performed in executing each transaction, or determined by any formula applicable to all customers. A substantial portion of the charge represented a source of additional transaction-based remuneration or revenue to the firm, and was effectively a minimum commission charge. By designating the charge on trade confirmations as “miscellaneous” and/or as an “additional fee” in addition to or in place of a designated commission charge, the firm mischaracterized and understated the amount of the total commissions the firm charged.

SEC Charges Five New York Based Traders with Short Selling Violations

On July 2, 2014, the SEC announced that it had charged five traders for committing short selling violations while trading for themselves and Worldwide Capital Inc., a New York based proprietary firm that earlier this year paid the largest-ever monetary sanction for Rule 105 violations.

Worldwide Capital and its owner Jeffrey W. Lynn agreed to pay $7.2 million to settle SEC charges in March for violating Rule 105, which prohibits the short sale of an equity security during a restricted period and the subsequent purchase of that same security through the offering.

On July 2, 2014 the SEC settled administrative proceedings against Derek W. Bakarich, Carmela Brocco, Tina Lizzio, Steven J. Niemis, and William W. Vowell for violating Rule 105 by selling shares short during the restricted period and purchasing offering shares of the same securities they had shorted. They purchased the offering shares through accounts they opened in their names or names of alter ego corporate entities at large broker-dealers and then executed the short sales of the securities through an account in Worldwide’s name at different, smaller broker-dealers.

Each of the five traders agreed to settle the SEC’s charges and pay a collective total of nearly $750,000.

According to the SEC’s orders, Bakarich, Brocco, Lizzio, Niemis, and Vowell were selected by Lynn to conduct trades for Worldwide Capital, which he created for the purpose of investing and trading his own money. The traders he chose to trade his capital pursued an investment strategy focused primarily on obtaining allocations of new shares of public issuers coming to market through secondary and follow-on public offerings at a discount to the market price of the company’s shares that were already trading publicly. They sold short the shares in those issuers in advance of the offerings, hoping to profit by the difference between the price they paid to acquire the offered shares and the market price on the date of the offering. From approximately August 2009 to March 2012, Bakarich, Brocco, Lizzio, Niemis, and Vowell each violated Rule 105 in connection with at least nine covered offerings. They received ill-gotten gains ranging from approximately $16,000 to more than $200,000.

Each of the five traders agreed to cease and desist from violating Rule 105 without admitting or denying the findings in the SEC’s order. They agreed to disgorge all of their ill-gotten gains plus prejudgment interest and pay an additional penalty equal to 60 percent of the disgorgement amount.

SEC Charges Hedge Fund Advisory Firm and Others in South Florida-Based Scheme to Misuse Investor Proceeds

On June 23, 2014, the SEC announced that they had charged a West Palm Beach, Florida based hedge fund advisory firm and its founder with fraudulently shifting money from one investment to another without informing investors. The firm’s founder and another individual later pocketed some of the transferred investor proceeds to enrich themselves.

The SEC alleged that Weston Capital Asset Management LLC and its founder and president Albert Hallac illegally drained more than $17 million from a hedge fund they managed and transferred the money to a consulting and investment firm known as Swartz IP Services Group Inc. The transaction went against the hedge fund’s stated investment strategy and wasn’t disclosed to investors, who received account statements falsely portraying that their investment was performing as well or even better than before. Weston Capital’s former general counsel Keith Wellner assisted the activities.

The SEC further alleged that out of the transferred investor proceeds, Hallac, Wellner, and Hallac’s son collectively received $750,000 in payments from Swartz IP. Weston Capital and Hallac also wrongfully used $3.5 million to pay down a portion of a loan from another fund managed by the firm.

Weston Capital, Hallac, and Wellner agreed to settle the SEC’s charges along with Hallac’s son Jeffrey Hallac, who is named as a relief defendant in the SEC’s complaint for the purposes of recovering ill-gotten gains in his possession. The court will determine monetary sanctions for Weston Capital and Hallac at a later date. Wellner and Jeffrey Hallac each agreed to pay $120,000 in disgorgement.

According to the SEC’s complaint, Weston Capital managed more than a dozen unregistered hedge funds in early 2011 with combined total assets of approximately $230 million. One of the funds managed by the firm was Wimbledon Fund SPC, which was segregated into five separate classes of investment portfolios. The Class TT Segregated Portfolio was required to invest all of its investor money in a diversified multi-billion hedge fund called Tewksbury Investment Fund Ltd., that invested in short-term, low risk interest bearing accounts and U.S. Treasury Bills.

The SEC alleged that in violation of its stated investment strategy, Weston Capital and Hallac redeemed TT Portfolio’s entire investment in the Tewksbury hedge fund and transferred the money to Swartz IP. The transaction was not disclosed to investors and Weston Capital and Hallac solicited and received investments for the TT Portfolio during this time while knowing the funds would not be invested in Tewksbury. As soon as Swartz IP received the money transfers, it disbursed the funds primarily to a special purpose entity created to support and finance varying medically related business ventures.

The SEC’s complaint alleged that Weston and Hallac violated federal anti-fraud laws and rules as well as Sections 206(1), 206(2), and 206(4) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and Rule 206(4)-8, and that Wellner aided and abetted these violations. Without admitting or denying the allegations, Weston Capital, Hallac, and Wellner consented to the entry of a judgment enjoining them from future violations of these provisions.

FINRA Disciplinary Action Against Dawson James Securities, Inc.

In June 2014, FINRA announced that Dawson James Securities, Inc. submitted a Letter of Acceptance, Waiver and Consent in which the firm was censured, fined $75,000, and required to revise its Written Supervisory Procedures.

Without admitting or denying the findings, the firm consented to the sanctions and to the entry of findings that the firm’s Written Supervisory Procedures failed to provide for one or more of the four minimum requirements for adequate Written Supervisory Procedures in several subject areas, including registered representatives’ disclosure of potential conflicts of interests to clients; registered representatives’ trading in the opposite direction of solicited customer transactions; sales practice concerns, including unauthorized trading, suitability, excessive trading and free-riding; concentrations of securities in clients’ accounts; sharing of profits or losses in clients’ accounts; wash sales; coordinated trading; marking the open and marking the close; cancel-rebill transactions in clients’ accounts; and the review of registered representatives’ electronic communications.

The findings also stated that the firm failed to investigate numerous red flags relating to a registered representative’s activities. The firm failed to enforce its Written Supervisory Procedures, which specified that all electronic correspondence, whether incoming or outgoing, would be reviewed on a daily basis. The firm failed to ensure that its head trader was reasonably carrying out his delegated supervisory responsibilities relating to proprietary trading, trade reporting, clock synchronization, short sale compliance, compliance with the Manning Rule, mark ups and mark downs, and compliance with inventory guidelines.

FINRA Fines Merrill Lynch $8 Million; Over $89 Million Repaid to Retirement Accounts and Charities Overcharged for Mutual Funds

On June 16, 2014, FINRA announced that it had fined Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. $8 million for failing to waive mutual fund sales charges for certain charities and retirement accounts. FINRA also ordered Merrill Lynch to pay $24.4 million in restitution to affected customers, in addition to $64.8 million the firm has already repaid to disadvantaged investors.

Mutual funds offer several classes of shares, each with different sales charges and fees. Typically, Class A shares have lower fees than Class B and C shares, but charge customers an initial sales charge. Many mutual funds waive their upfront sales charges for retirement accounts and some waive these charges for charities.

Most of the mutual funds available on Merrill Lynch’s retail platform offered such waivers to retirement plan accounts and disclosed those waivers in their prospectuses. However, at various times since at least January 2006, Merrill Lynch did not waive the sales charges for affected customers when it offered Class A shares. As a result, approximately 41,000 small business retirement plan accounts, and approximately 6,800 charities and 403(b) retirement accounts available to ministers and employees of public schools, either paid sales charges when purchasing Class A shares, or purchased other share classes that unnecessarily subjected them to higher ongoing fees and expenses. Merrill Lynch learned in 2006 that its small business retirement plan customers were overpaying, but continued to sell them more costly shares and failed to report the issue to FINRA for more than five years.

Merrill Lynch’s written supervisory procedures provided little information or guidance on mutual fund sales charge waivers. Even after the firm learned that it was not providing sales charge waivers to eligible accounts, Merrill Lynch relied on its financial advisors to waive the charges, but failed to adequately supervise the sale of these products or properly train or notify its financial advisors about lower-cost alternatives.

In concluding this settlement, Merrill Lynch neither admitted nor denied the charges, but consented to the entry of FINRA’s findings.

SEC Charges Hedge Fund Adviser With Conducting Conflicted Transactions and Retaliating Against Whistleblower

On June 16, 2014, the SEC announced that it had charged an Albany, N.Y.-based hedge fund advisory firm with engaging in prohibited principal transactions and then retaliating against the employee who reported the trading activity to the SEC. This was the first time the SEC had filed a case under its new authority to bring anti-retaliation enforcement actions. The SEC also charged the firm’s owner with causing the improper principal transactions.

Paradigm Capital Management and owner Candace King Weir agreed to pay $2.2 million to settle the charges.

According to the SEC’s order instituting a settled administrative proceeding, Weir conducted transactions between Paradigm and a broker-dealer that she also owned while trading on behalf of a hedge fund client. Such principal transactions pose conflicts between the interests of the adviser and the client, and therefore advisers are required to disclose that they are participating on both sides of the trade and must obtain the client’s consent. Paradigm failed to provide effective written disclosure to the hedge fund and did not obtain its consent as required prior to the completion of each principal transaction.

A Commission rule adopted in 2011 under the Dodd-Frank Act authorized the SEC to bring enforcement actions based on retaliation against whistleblowers who report potential securities law violations to the agency. The SEC’s order found that after Paradigm learned that the firm’s head trader had reported potential misconduct to the SEC, the firm engaged in a series of retaliatory actions that ultimately resulted in the head trader’s resignation.

According to the SEC’s order, Paradigm’s head trader reported trading activity revealing that Paradigm engaged in prohibited principal transactions with affiliated broker-dealer C.L. King & Associates while trading on behalf of hedge fund client PCM Partners L.P. II. The SEC’s subsequent investigation found that Paradigm engaged in the trading strategy from at least 2009 to 2011 to reduce the tax liability of the firm’s hedge fund investors. As part of that strategy, Weir directed Paradigm’s traders to sell securities that had unrealized losses from the hedge fund to a proprietary trading account at C.L. King. The realized losses were used to offset the hedge fund’s realized gains. Paradigm engaged in at least 83 principal transactions by selling 47 securities positions from the hedge fund to C.L. King and then repurchasing 36 of those positions for the hedge fund.

According to the SEC’s order, since Weir had a conflicted role as owner of the brokerage firm in addition to advising the PCM Partners hedge fund, merely providing written disclosure to her as the hedge fund’s general partner and obtaining her consent was insufficient. Paradigm attempted to satisfy the written disclosure and consent requirements by establishing a conflicts committee to review and approve each of the principal transactions on behalf of the hedge fund.

The SEC’s order found that the conflicts committee itself, however, was conflicted. The committee consisted of two people: Paradigm’s chief financial officer and chief compliance officer – who each essentially reported to Weir. Furthermore, Paradigm’s CFO also served as C.L. King’s CFO, which placed him in a conflict. Specifically, there was a negative impact on C.L. King’s net capital each time the broker-dealer purchased securities from the hedge fund. The CFO’s obligation to monitor C.L. King’s net capital requirement was in conflict with his obligation to act in the best interests of the hedge fund as a member of the conflicts committee.

According to the SEC’s order, because the conflicts committee was conflicted, Paradigm failed to provide effective written disclosure to its hedge fund client and failed effectively to obtain the hedge fund’s consent prior to the completion of each principal transaction. The SEC’s order also finds that Paradigm’s Form ADV was materially misleading for failing to disclose the CFO’s conflict as a member of the conflicts committee.

“Paradigm’s use of a conflicted committee denied its hedge fund client the effective disclosure and consent to which it was entitled,” said Julie M. Riewe, co-chief of the SEC Enforcement Division’s Asset Management Unit. “Advisers to pooled investment vehicles need to ensure that any mechanism developed to address conflicts in principal transactions actually mitigates those conflicts.”

According to the SEC’s order, Paradigm’s former head trader made a whistleblower submission to the SEC that revealed the principal transactions between Paradigm and C.L. King. After learning that he had reported potential violations to the SEC, Paradigm immediately engaged in a series of retaliatory actions. Paradigm removed him from his head trader position, tasked him with investigating the very conduct he reported to the SEC, changed his job function from head trader to a full-time compliance assistant, stripped him of his supervisory responsibilities, and otherwise marginalized him.

Paradigm and Weir consented to the entry of the order finding that Paradigm violated Section 21F(h) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Sections 206(3) and 207 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. The order finds that Weir caused Paradigm’s violations of Section 206(3) of the Advisers Act. They each agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing future violations of these provisions without admitting or denying the findings in the order. Paradigm and Weir agreed to jointly and severally pay disgorgement of $1.7 million for distribution to current and former investors in the hedge fund, and pay prejudgment interest of $181,771 and a penalty of $300,000. Paradigm also agreed to retain an independent compliance consultant.

SEC Charges Chicago-Based Investment Fund Manager With Stealing Investor Money and Conducting Ponzi Scheme

On May 29, 2014, the SEC announced fraud charges and an asset freeze against a Chicago-based investment fund manager accused of stealing money he raised from investors to pay personal and business expenses.

The SEC alleged that Neal V. Goyal told investors that the private funds he managed would invest in securities following a “long-short” trading strategy. However, Goyal actually did little trading and simply operated a Ponzi scheme that used new investor funds to pay redemptions to existing investors and fund his own lavish lifestyle. Goyal concealed the poor results of the few investments he did make by sending investors phony account statements that grossly overstated the performance of the funds.

According to the SEC’s complaint filed in federal court in Chicago, Goyal raised more than $11.4 million in the last several years for investments in four private funds that he managed and controlled. Goyal’s investment strategy lost money from the outset, but he hid those losses from investors through the Ponzi payments and phony account statements. Meanwhile, Goyal misused investor funds to make down-payments and pay the mortgages on two homes he purchased. He also siphoned away investor money to invest in a Chicago tavern, fund two children’s clothing boutiques that his wife operates in Chicago, and purchase artwork and lavish furniture.

The SEC’s complaint filed on May 28th charged Goyal and two investment advisers that he owned and controlled with violating the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5, and Investment Advisers Act of 1940. The SEC is seeking financial penalties, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains plus prejudgment interest, and a permanent injunction against Goyal, Blue Horizon Asset Management, and Caldera Advisors. The SEC named another Goyal-controlled entity Caldera Investment Group as a relief defendant in its complaint for the purpose of recovering any investor funds it received.

At the SEC’s request, Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer issued a permanent injunction and asset freeze on May 28th against Goyal and his firms, who consented to the order without admitting or denying the allegations in the SEC’s complaint. Under the court’s order, monetary remedies will be decided at a later date.

FINRA Fines Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC $5,000,000 for Supervisory Failures Related to Sales of Shares in 83 Initial Public Offerings to Retail Customers

On May 6, 2014, FINRA announced that it has fined Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC $5,000,000 for supervisory failures related to the solicitation of retail customers to invest in initial public offerings (IPOs). From February 16, 2012, to May 1, 2013, Morgan Stanley Smith Barney sold shares to retail customers in 83 IPOs, including Facebook and Yelp, without having adequate procedures and training to ensure that its sales staff distinguished between “indications of interest” and “conditional offers” in its solicitations of potential investors.

Firms may solicit non-binding indications of customer interest in an IPO prior to the effective date of the registration statement. An “indication of interest” will only result in the purchase of shares if it is reconfirmed by the investor after the registration statement is effective. Brokerage firms are also permitted to solicit “conditional offers to buy,” which may result in a binding transaction after effectiveness of the registration statement if the investor does not act to revoke the conditional offer before the firm accepts it.

On February 16, 2012, Morgan Stanley Smith Barney adopted a policy that used the terms “indications of interest” and “conditional offers” interchangeably, without proper regard for whether retail interest reconfirmation was required prior to execution. The firm did not offer any training or other materials to its financial advisers to clarify the policy and, as a result, sales staff and customers may not have properly understood what type of commitment was being solicited. FINRA also found that Morgan Stanley Smith Barney failed to adequately monitor compliance with its policy and did not have procedures in place to ensure that conditional offers were being properly solicited consistent with the requirements of the federal securities laws and FINRA rules.

In settling this matter, Morgan Stanley Smith Barney neither admitted nor denied the charges, but consented to the entry of FINRA’s findings.

NRA Fines LPL Financial LLC $950,000 for Supervisory Failures Related to Sales of Alternative Investments

On March 24, 2014, FINRA announced that it had fined LPL Financial LLC $950,000 for supervisory deficiencies related to the sales of alternative investment products, including non-traded real estate investment trusts (REITs), oil and gas partnerships, business development companies (BDCs), hedge funds, managed futures and other illiquid pass-through investments. As part of the sanction, LPL must also conduct a comprehensive review of its policies, systems, procedures and training, and remedy the failures.

Many alternative investments, such as REITs, set forth concentration limits for investors in their offering documents. In addition, certain states have imposed concentration limits for investors in alternative investments. LPL also established its own concentration guidelines for alternative investments. However, FINRA found that from January 1, 2008, to July 1, 2012, LPL failed to adequately supervise the sales of alternative investments that violated these concentration limits. At first, LPL used a manual process to review whether an investment complied with suitability requirements, relying on information that was at times outdated and inaccurate. The firm later implemented an automated system for review, but that database contained flawed programming and was not updated in a timely manner to accurately reflect suitability standards. LPL also did not adequately train its supervisory staff to analyze state suitability standards as part of their suitability reviews of alternative investments.

In settling this matter, LPL Financial LLC neither admitted nor denied the charges, but consented to the entry of FINRA’s findings.

SEC Charges Stockbroker and Law Firm Managing Clerk in $5.6 Million Insider Trading Scheme

On March 19, 2014, the SEC announced that they had charged a stockbroker and a managing clerk at a law firm with insider trading around more than a dozen mergers or other corporate transactions for illicit profits of $5.6 million during a four-year period.

The SEC alleged that Vladimir Eydelman and Steven Metro were linked through a mutual friend who acted as a middleman in the illegal trading scheme. Metro, who worked at Simpson Thacher & Bartlett in New York, obtained material nonpublic information about corporate clients involved in pending deals by accessing confidential documents in the law firm’s computer system. Metro typically tipped the middleman during in-person meetings at a New York City coffee shop, and the middleman later met Eydelman, who was his stockbroker, near the clock and information booth in Grand Central Terminal. The middleman tipped Eydelman, who was a registered representative at Oppenheimer and later at Morgan Stanley, by showing him a post-it note or napkin with the relevant ticker symbol. After the middleman chewed up and sometimes even ate the note or napkin, Eydelman went on to use the illicit tip to illegally trade on his own behalf as well as for family members, the middleman, and other customers. The middleman allocated a portion of his profits for eventual payment back to Metro in exchange for the inside information. Metro also personally traded in advance of at least two deals.

According to the SEC’s complaint, the insider trading scheme began in early February 2009 at a bar in New York City when Metro met the middleman and other friends for drinks. When Metro and the middleman separated from the rest of their friends and began discussing stocks, the middleman expressed concern about his holdings in Sirius XM Radio and his fear that the company may go bankrupt. Metro divulged that Liberty Media Corp. planned to invest more than $500 million in Sirius, and said he obtained this information by viewing documents at the law firm where he worked. As a result, the middleman later called Eydelman and told him to buy additional shares of Sirius. Eydelman expressed similar concern about Sirius’ struggling stock, but the middleman assured him that his reliable source was a friend who worked at a law firm. The middleman told Metro following the announcement that he had set aside approximately $7,000 for Metro as a “thank you” for the information. Instead of taking the money, Metro told the middleman to leave it in his brokerage account and invest it on Metro’s behalf based on confidential information that he planned to pass him in the future.

Also according to the SEC’s complaint, Metro tipped and Eydelman traded on inside information about 12 more companies as they settled into a routine to cloak their illegal activities. Metro shared confidential nonpublic information with the middleman by typing on his cell phone screen the names or ticker symbols of the two companies involved in the transaction. Metro pointed to the names or ticker symbols to indicate which company was the acquirer and which was being acquired. Metro also conveyed the approximate price of the transaction and the approximate announcement date. The middleman then communicated to Eydelman that they should meet. Once at Grand Central Station, the middleman walked up to Eydelman and showed him the post-it note or napkin containing the ticker symbol of the company whose stock price was likely to increase as a result of the corporate transaction. Eydelman watched the middleman chew or eat the tip to destroy the evidence. Eydelman also learned from the middleman an approximate price of the transaction and an approximate announcement date.

The SEC alleged that Eydelman then returned to his office and typically gathered research about the target company. He eventually e-mailed the research to the middleman along with his purported thoughts about why buying the stock made sense. The contrived e-mails were intended to create what Eydelman and the middleman believed to be a sufficient paper trail with plausible justification for engaging in the transaction.

According to the SEC’s complaint, Eydelman also traded on inside information in the accounts of more than 50 of his brokerage customers. Eydelman earned substantial commissions as a result of this trading, and received bonuses from his employers based on his performance driven in large part by the profits garnered through the insider trading scheme. The middleman’s agreement with Metro resulted in more than $168,000 being apportioned to Metro as his share of profits from the insider trading scheme in addition to his profits from personally trading in advance of at least two transactions.

The SEC’s complaint charged Metro and Eydelman with violating Sections 10(b) and 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rules 10b-5 and 14e-3 as well as Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933. The complaint is seeking a final judgment ordering Metro and Eydelman to pay disgorgement of their ill-gotten gains plus prejudgment interest and penalties, and permanent injunctions from future violations of these provisions of the federal securities laws.